FLEX Workshop #1141 - 1:00-2:50 p.m. - OCN 3516


Anthrax, Smallpox and Bioterrorism

Current events have directed our attention to bioterrorism. What is anthrax? What is smallpox? What other biological agents should we fear? While a fear of the unknown is logical, is it logical to be obsessed with bioterrorism? How can we prepare for bioterrorism, if it should occur? This workshop will include information about several biological agents that could be used for a bioterrorism attack, what US government and its health-related agencies are doing to prepare and to protect us, and what we can do to be safer. Relying on my background studying Bacillus anthracis, the bacterium which causes the disease anthrax, we will discuss these biological agents, how they cause disease, how to cure these diseases, and how to prevent wide-spread dissemination of these disease-causing agents. Guest speakers will be part of this presentation, including current military personnel, who will help discuss aspects of this subject.

Prior to this presentation information will be available online at: http://www.miracosta.edu/home/dlr/anthrax.htm

Meeting time is 1:00 - 2:50 p.m. in OCN 3516.  After the formal presentations, there will be time for Questions and Answers.

Presentors include:


Title and brief outline of presentations 

Speaker

Title of Presentation

Donald Robertson Anthrax, Smallpox and Bioterrorism

Introduction of presentation speakers.  A discussion of Bacillus anthracis, the bacterium which causes anthrax, and its history in medicine and biological warfare.

Albin Quiko Biological Warfare Agents

Classifications of Biological Warfare (BW) Agents

  • Bacterial Agents: Anthrax, Brucellosis, Cholera, Glanders, Pneumonic Plague, Tularemia, Q Fever
  • Viral Agents: Small Pox, Venezuelan Equine Encephalitis, Viral Hemorrhagic Fevers
  • Biological Toxins: Botulism, Staph Enterotoxin B, Ricin, T-2 Mycotoxin

Methods to Deploying a BW Agent

  • Line Source: Meaning a mechanism by which the adversary can deploy the agent in its aerosolized form in a straight line and allow the natural meteorological conditions to carry it to the target. Such as a crop duster.
  • Point Source: A fixed source that will deploy the agent without itself moving. Such as a sprinkler head, fog machine.

How BW Agents work

Additional information on biological agents, treatments, prevention and protection.

Steven Leapley Terrorism: the San Diego Response

Introduction and a little History

Public Health Priorities

Metropolitan Medical Strike Team (MMRS)

  • What is it?
  • Who is it?
  • When does it respond?
  • Where does it respond?
  • How does it respond?
  • Phases of an event


Biographical Information about Speakers:

Speaker: Steven Leapley

Steven Leapley is an EMS Specialist with the County of San Diego, Emergency Medical Services as well as an EMS RT&D consultant. Steve has a BS in Organizational Behavior with a minor in Education. Within San Diego County, Steven is the Training & Certification Coordinator responsible for oversight of all accredited EMS training and continuing education agencies and programs within the County, as well as the BLS Operations Coordinator. His background includes over 11 years in Prehospital EMS and 9 years in Prehospital EMS education as an instructor and curriculum development specialist for various county, national, and military programs. Steve is an active member in local, state, and national EMS committees. He is one of the County's Bio-terrorism speakers and the military liaison for the County's Metropolitan Medical Strike Team (MMST). Steve is also the editor for a quarterly newsletter, The EMS Trainer. Steve just finished working with a team of various EMS educators for an upcoming curriculum entitled "EMS Response to Terrorism," which he will present in the upcoming NAEMSE Symposium in Portland, OR on September 7, 2002

Steve Leapley can be reached via email at steven.Leapley@sdcounty.ca.gov.

 

Speaker: LT Albin Quiko

LT Albin Quiko is a member of the United States Navy Nurse Corps.  His specialty is in Combat Trauma Nursing, with an emphasis in the Medical Management of Chemical and Biological Warfare Casualties.  LT Quiko is assisting today, not as an official representative of the U.S. Military but as a private citizen who has an expertise in the areas being presented.  His presentation is not official military policy or practices, but represents the understanding of an informed medical professional.

Albin Quiko can be reached via email at jnytrama@san.rr.com

 

Speaker: Dr. Donald Robertson

Dr. Robertson holds a Ph.D. in biochemistry and served for fifteen years as a professor of biochemistry at Brigham Young University where he did anthrax-related research .  Over a period of about ten years, Dr. Robertson received in excess of $1 million in research funds from the United States Army Medical Research and Development Command.  He spent a sabbatical year at the United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID) at Fort Detrick, MD.  He was responsible for the cloning and initial characterization of the three anthrax toxin genes, their expression in bacteria, and the purification and characterization of the virulence (disease-causing) plasmids found in Bacillus anthracis, the bacterium which causes the disease anthrax.  He has published his anthrax-related research in international scientific journals and continues to consult with scientists at BYU and several biotech firms.

Donald Robertson can be reached via email at doninla@pacbell.net.  

Additional information about Dr. Robertson can be obtained at: http://www.miracosta.edu/home/dlr/cv.htm


Smallpox Revaccination:  http://www.msnbc.com/news/850537.asp

Bioterrorism Links: http://stacks.msnbc.com/news/anthrax_front.asp


Article in USAToday

09/18/2002 - Updated 06:54 PM ET

http://usatoday.com/news/nation/2002-09-18-anthrax-year_x.htm

Work remains in preparing for bioterrorism

WASHINGTON (AP) — A year after the first anthrax-tainted letters were dropped into a New Jersey mailbox, the nation is vastly better prepared to face bioterrorism. Yet experts agree that major holes remain in communications, emergency planning and staffing, and many fear the country's resolve could fade along with memories of the attacks.

There have been no arrests and there are officially no suspects in the criminal investigation into the attacks-by-mail, which killed five and sickened 18. While the investigation appears stalled, efforts to prepare for the next attack have moved steadily forward.

"Public health has always been the poor stepchild. It's never received the dollars, it's never received the attention," said Health and Human Services Secretary Tommy Thompson. "One of the good consequences of 9-11 is we now have the resources available to build the public health system."

Much work remains.

An expanded National Pharmaceutical Stockpile is loaded with medicines, vaccines and supplies, ready to land a cargo plane with 50 tons of material in any city within hours. But many communities have no plan for transporting those supplies to the public.

States have new money to hire public health workers, but there is a dearth of talent for hire.

While cities are now focusing on the threat, experts worry there is still no efficient way to get medical information to the doctors on the front lines.

Dr. Julie Gerberding, director of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, described a "mosaic of preparedness."

"In some areas, certain aspects are absolutely gold standard and others have a ways to go, and in a neighboring district it might be just the opposite," she said Wednesday.

Despite the limited scale of the anthrax attacks, the public health system was severely taxed under the weight of investigating hundreds of false alarms, testing more than 120,000 environmental samples and distributing antibiotics to thousands of people who may have been exposed to the bacteria.

"Last fall was a tragic dry run," said Dr. Michael Osterholm of the University of Minnesota, who advises HHS on bioterrorism. "That was horrible but we all know what it could have been had the same amount of anthrax been put into air intake systems."

The long-neglected public health infrastructure — the people and systems who guard the community's health — got an unprecedented, rapid infusion of dollars, nearly $1 billion. "I can't remember a time when money went out that quickly," Osterholm said.

Yet he and other experts are concerned states will fail to put up their own money to finish the job or, worse, will cut back existing state spending now that the federal dollars have arrived. Some want Washington to ensure that the states spend the money wisely, something HHS has pledged to do.

But other issues remain:

·National Pharmaceutical Stockpile: A year ago, the stockpile had just 15 million doses of smallpox vaccine; soon, there will be enough for every American. But officials worry that many communities do not have plans to get those supplies to distribution and treatment centers. Also of concern: having enough trained workers to handle mass vaccinations, if needed.

·Communications. During the anthrax crisis, federal officials failed to communicate accurate information to the public, the media and to state and local counterparts. Lack of clear communication "would be my No. 1, my No. 2 and probably my No. 3" biggest failures, said Steve Ostroff, a CDC epidemiologist.

CDC has lots of work ahead. Gerberding recently called her agency's emergency line and got a recorded message telling her to call another number. When she called that number, she got the same recording. She called communications the most important priority for her office's work on bioterrorism.

·Reaching doctors: In a crisis, doctors need up-to-date information about symptoms and treatments, but there is no clear way to disseminate new data quickly. Many doctors do not have e-mail in their offices, and most public health departments do not have an up-to-date list of fax numbers, said Dr. Ed Thompson, director of the Mississippi Department of Health. Mail is too slow and much is never opened.

·Research. About $130 million already has been added to the bioterrorism budget to research new vaccines and treatments. But some wonder whether new vaccines will ever be produced, given the questionable market for them. Private manufacturers already balk at producing standard childhood vaccines because their profit margin is so low.

·Workers. Even with money to hire more workers, experts worry that there aren't enough trained epidemiologists, lab technicians and other public health experts. "Frankly, the talent isn't out there," said Tara O'Toole, director of the Johns Hopkins Center for Civilian Biodefense Strategies.

·Hospitals. The government wants one hospital in each community designated to house contagious smallpox patients, but hospitals fear liability and other consequences of getting that designation.

A small community of experts had long argued that the country was vulnerable to bioterrorism, but their warnings received little attention before last fall. Now experts fear that as memories of the anthrax attacks fade, attention to solving these problems may, too.

Osterholm hopes people stay a little scared. He points to the fire department at the Minneapolis airport. There's never been a fire there.

"But tonight could be the night," he says. "We have to understand today can be the day that the next shoe drops."


Copyright 2002 The Associated Press. All rights reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten or redistributed.

© Copyright 2002 USA TODAY, a division of Gannett Co. Inc.